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MARITIME LAW - DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMU-
NITY HELD INAPPLICABLE WITHIN FEDERAL ADMIRALTY 
JURISDICTION. Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981). 
While on board her husband's pleasure boat in the waters off Vir-
ginia, Mrs. Byrd was injured when the deck chair in which she was 
seated fell from the flying bridge. 1 Claiming her injuries were a result 
of her husband's negligence in failing either to affix the chair properly 
to the deck or to provide guard rails around the bridge, Mrs. Byrd sued 
her husband in admiralty in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia. The district court ruled that state law con-
trolled, and applying Virginia's doctrine of interspousal immunity, 2 
dismissed the suit.3 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit held that the doctrine of interspousal immunity does 
not apply to tort actions within federal admiralty jurisdiction.4 In so 
holding, the court preempted the state law of Virginia5 and devised a 
new rule in admiralty. 
The state-federal choice of law question in admiralty jurisdiction 
presented in Byrd v. Byrd6 has its roots in the Constitution. While Ar-
ticle III extended federal judicial power to "all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction,"7 it did not indicate the source of the law to be 
applied. The Judiciary Act of 17898 implemented the constitutional 
grant of federal maritime power and included the "savings clause" 
which permits a suitor asserting an in personam admiralty claim to 
elect to sue in state court.9 The Act did not stipulate, however, the 
source of the substantive law to be applied in state court cases. None-
theless, in the landmark case of lJe Lovio v. Boil, \0 Justice Story estab-
lished the adoftion by the United States of the international general 
maritime law,l which may be altered or supplemented by Congress. 12 
1. Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 616 (4th Cir. 1981). 
2. The doctrine of interspousal immunity is the common law rule prohibiting tort 
actions between spouses. See generally Note, Litigation Between Husband and 
Wife, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1650 (1966). 
3. Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 616 (4th Cir. 1981). 
4. Id at 621. 
5. At the time suit was brought, Virginia utilized the doctrine of interspousal immu-
nity in tort suits except in automobile cases and in wrongful death cases where one 
spouse had killed the other spouse. Counts v. Counts, 221 Va. 151,266 S.E.2d 895 
(1980). However, effective July I, 1981 interspousal immunity in tort suits was 
abolished in Virginia. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-220.1 (1981). 
6. 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981). 
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
8. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, I Stat. 73 (1789). 
9. This clause, which now appears at 28 U.S.c. § 1333 (1976), provides: "The dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: 
(1) Any civil case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all 
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." Id 
10. 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776). InJJe Lovio, Justice Story referred 
to the uniformity and international character of maritime law and stated that 
these principles were adopted by the Constitution. 
II. Much of the maritime law today has no statutory warrant, but is derived from the 
corpus of maritime law assumed to be in existence at the time of the adoption of 
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A major principle of maritime law is uniformity, the objective be-
ing to ensure that maritime commerce is not hindered by a myriad of 
conflicting local, state, and national laws. 13 Yet, prior to the twentieth 
century, uniformity existed only within the federal system of admiralty 
courts. State courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction over diversity 
cases and over maritime cases under the "savings clause" were free to 
apply their own laws. 14 
In 1900, however, the United States Supreme Court began to im-
pose restraints on the application of state law in maritime cases. In 
Workman v. New York City, 15 the Court held that local law could not 
be employed when the result would be to destroy or alter rights of par-
ties subject to the jurisdiction of the admiralty courtS. 16 This decision 
foreshadowed the holding in Southern Pac!fic Co. v. Jensen 17 which 
overturned precedent lS in establishing the principle that maritime law 
must be applied in all courts, whether state or federal, in admiralty 
cases. 19 The Court in Jensen determined that the power to define the 
maritime law rested in Congress, and that in the absence of some con-
trolling statute, the general maritime law as interpreted by the federal 
courts applied to admiralty matters.20 
As to the extent the general maritime law could be modified by 
state legislation, the Jensen Court held that any local legislation contra-
vening the essential purposes of maritime law or interfering with its 
goals of consistency and uniformity was invalid.21 A further limitation 
on state legislation was established in Chelentis v. Luckenbach s.s. 
Co. 22 which rejected the argument that the common law courts could 
create rights in the maritime field when no federal legislation or general 
maritime principle furnished relief.23 
The Workman, Jensen, and Chelentis cases firmly established the 
requirement of complete uniformity in the maritime law. This de-
the Constitution. G. GILMORE & c. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-16 (2d 
ed. 1975). 
12. Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924). 
13. See G. GILMORE & c. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 1-1 to 1-19 (2d ed. 
1975). 
14. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The lJevil's Own Mess," 1960 SUP. CT. 
REv. 158, 160-61. 
15. 179 U.S. 552 (1900) (municipally owned fire boat negligently collided with an-
other vessel). 
16. Id. at 558. 
17. 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917) (state's workman's compensation statute unconstitutional 
as applied to injured longshoreman). 
18. E.g., The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907) (state statute enforceable in a federal 
admiralty court); Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893) (application of land-based 
rules of damage distribution in collision case). 
19. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. 247 U.S. 372 (1918). 
23. Id. at 384. 
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mand, however, was not met by the results of the cases that followed,24 
for the permissible extent of state supplementation of maritime law had 
not been clearly defined by the courts.25 Uniformity required only the 
invalidation of state law that materially conflicted with the maritime 
law.26 Moreover, in the areas that were not covered by the general 
maritime law and in which there were no applicable federal statutes the 
question remained whether to apply state law or to create an admiralty 
rule.27 In this context, the Supreme Court in Kermarec v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique 28 fashioned a rule to determine a shipowner's 
liability to the injured guest of a crew member, perceiving the declara-
tion of the maritime law to be its function.29 In contrast, the Court in 
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance CO.,30 in the absence of 
a controlling federal rule, turned to state law to determine the effect of 
a harmless breach of warranty in a policy of maritime insurance.31 
Grounded on the premise that issues which are primarily a state 
concern should be adjudicated by state law, the rationale of the 
Supreme Court in Wilburn reflects the current maritime choice-of-Iaw 
philosophy. This philosophy embodies the concept that the demand 
for uniformity is not inflexible and does not preclude the weighing of 
state and national interests in determining the source of law to be ap-
plied in maritime actions. Rather, when there is an overlapping of fed-
eral and state interests, the process is one of accomodation. The result, 
as articulated in Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 32 is that when the interfer-
ence with uniformity is sufficient to outweigh the relevant state inter-
ests, state law will not be applied.33 
The consideration of the federal interest in uniformity was the ba-
24. Compare Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941) (application of Florida statute 
under which an action for personal injuries survived the death of the tort-feasor 
upheld although the maritime law did not recognize survival actions) with Robins 
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 (1925) (New York statute imposing 
an absolute duty to provide a safe place to work rejected by Supreme Court on 
ground that state law can neither impair nor enlarge the duties imposed by gen-
eral maritime law). 
25. Stevens, Erie v. Tompkins and The Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 HARV. L. 
REv. 246, 256 (1950). 
26.Id 
27. See, e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); 
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955). 
28. 358 U.S. 625 (1959). 
29.Id at 632. 
30. 348 U.S. 310 (1955). 
31. The relevant Texas statutes made recovery under a passenger carriage warranty 
available only if the breach contributed causally to the loss. See Wilburn Boat 
Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 201 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953), rev'd and remanded, 
348 U.S. 310 (1955). 
32. 365 U.S. 731 (1961). 
33. Id at 738. In Kossick the Supreme Court held that the application of the New 
York statute of frauds to the maritime contract at issue would substantially dis-
turb the uniformity of maritime law. Id at 742. 
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sis of the decision in Byrd v. Byrd, 34 where the Fourth Circuit decided 
to establish a federal admiralty rule governing interspousal immunity 
rather than to apply state law. After observing the unsettled status of 
the doctrine of interspousal immunity among the states,35 the Byrd 
court concluded that reference to state law in deciding maritime tort 
suits between husbands and wives would impair uniformity. Addition-
ally, the court indicated that the application of state law in the instant 
case, which would result in dismissal of the suit, would operate to de-
feat the federal right of recovery afforded to all who are injured by 
negligence in the operation of a boat. 36 
Once the Byrd court created the foundation to support its decision 
to create a maritime rule relevant to interspousal immunity, it easily 
determined what that rule should be. The two mainstays of the doc-
trine of inters po usa I immunity, the concept of husband and wife as one 
flesh, and the preservation of familial harmony, were dismissed as no 
longer applicable.37 The court noted further that adoption of the doc-
trine of interspousal immunity when the trend is toward its abolition 
would be anomalous.38 Thus the court held that marriage between 
plaintiff and defendant does not create an immunity barring recovery 
for torts within federal admiralty jurisdiction.39 
The decision in Byrd v. Byrd4Q is consistent with established prin-
ciples relevant to the choice-of-Iaw problem in admiralty cases. Hold-
ing that state law may not apply when it defeats a federal right of 
recovery or detracts from the uniformity of maritime law, Byrd reaf-
34. 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981). 
35. Id at 618. 
36. Id; see a/so St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 980-81 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(Arkansas statute limiting recovery for social guest on boats held not applicable 
because it would defeat federal right of recovery). 
37. Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 1981). The Married Woman's Property 
Acts, enacted in the mid-nineteenth century, gave a married woman a separate 
legal identity and started a continuing trend away from the strictness of common 
law immunity and the idea that husband and wife were one. See, e.g., MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 45, §§ 1-20 (1981 & Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-601 to 36-
605 (1977). In regard to domestic harmony, a number of jurisdictions have rea-
soned that the bringing of a tort action between spouses indicates that such har-
mony has already been disrupted, and that the alternative remedies of criminal 
prosecution and divorce would be equally disruptive. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 
692,376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Selfv. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 64, 
26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962). 
An additional theory advanced in support of the doctrine of interspousal im-
munity includes the possibility of collusion between husband and wife when the 
injury is covered by insurance. Comment, Toward Abo/ilion of Inlerspousa/ TorI 
Immunity, 36 MONT. L. REv. 251, 257 (1975). Judge Murnaghan, writing for the 
court in Byrd, stated that rather than increasing the probability of collusion, the 
presence of insurance decreases the probability of interference with familial har-
mony. Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 1981). 
38. Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 1981). 
39. Id 
40. 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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firms the rule of Southern Pac!ftc Co. v. Jensen,41 Chelentis v. Lucken-
bach S.S. Co. ,42 and their progeny. 
If the Byrd holding may be criticized, it is on the basis of the 
court's balancing of the state and federal interests present in the case. 
The fact that an event may occur on navigable waters does not deprive 
a state of its legitimate concern over matters affecting its residents. The 
federal interest weighs more heavily regarding commercial and mer-
cantile matters than personal injuries.43 The true question in Byrd is 
whether tort claims arising out of pleasure craft operation on state terri-
torial waters need be decided under maritime law.44 In tum, the source 
of that problem is the fact that in maritime cases the primary determi-
nant of admiralty jurisdiction is the locality of the tort; that is, whether 
the event occurred on navigable or nonnavigable waters.45 
The Byrd court itself raises the question of whether locality alone 
is a sufficient justification for the extension of admiralty jurisdiction 
over tort claims involving pleasure craft.46 This point suggests that if 
such a suit may not warrant admiralty jurisdiction, it also may not war-
rant the creation of a new admiralty rule, particularly when the court 
could have reached the same result by applying state law.47 
Alternatively, the need to formulate a new rule would have been 
obviated had the court viewed Mrs. Byrd's claim as a tort action for 
injury caused by the negligent operation of a boat, for the maritime 
rule providing for recovery by persons injured by such negligence 
could have been dispositive.48 Mrs. Byrd's right to relief may also have 
been preserved if that rule were interpreted broadly, analogizing to 
41. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
42. 247 U.S. 372 (1918). 
43. See G. GILMORE & c. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-9, at 30 (2d ed. 1975). 
44. Compare Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972) 
(Court required "maritime nexus" to justify admiralty jurisdiction) and Crosson 
v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973) (court denied admiralty jurisdiction to a 
water-skier injured on Chesapeake Bay) with Foremost Ins. Co. v .. Richardson, 
102 S. Ct. 2654 (all operators of vessels on navigable waters, not just individuals 
actually engaged in commercial maritime activities, are subject to maritime law), 
reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 198 (1982) and Richards v. Blake Builders Supply Co., 
528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975) (maritime law applied to pleasure craft operation); 
see also Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Pleasure Craft Torts, 36 MD. L. 
REV. 212 (1976). 
45. See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776). The De 
Lovio court held that admiralty jurisdiction in tort extended to all navigable wa-
ters. Navigable waters include the high seas, ports and harbors connected with 
the high seas, the Great Lakes, and all the rivers and lakes in the United States 
which are in fact navigable in interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of 
whether they come within state boundaries. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE 
LAW OF ADMIRALTY § I-II, at 31-33 (2d ed. 1975). 
46. Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 617 n.4 (4th Cir. 1981). 
47. Subsequent to the filing of the original suit, but prior to appeal, Virginia abolished 
interspousal immunity in tort suits. Id. at 617 n.5; see also supra note 5. 
48. See St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1974) (a federal right of 
recovery exists for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a boat). 
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Remington v. Remington 49 where the words "any person" in the rele-
vant federal statute were construed to include spouses. 50 
Although Maryland has modified its rule on interspousal immu-
nity to the extent that the doctrine no longer applies to outrageous in-
tentional torts,51 it is unlikely that the decision in Byrd will act as an 
impetus to the abolition of the doctrine in this state. While Byrd repre-
sents abrogation of the doctrine at the federal level, Maryland case law 
demonstrates the resistance of the courts to the alteration of common 
law rules, even when the rationale for the rule has lost its validity and 
the application of the rule brings about harsh results. 52 This judicial 
reluctance can be explained by the court's traditional deference to the 
legislature. 53 
The holding in Byrd does not alter Maryland law, but ramifica-
tions of the decision in the state are foreseeable. The disposition of a 
suit brought in Maryland by one spouse against another based on a 
negligent tort will tum on whether the injury occurred on land or on 
navigable waters. This anomaly results from the limitation on the exer-
cise of state law required by the policy of uniformity in maritime law 
and can be avoided by recognition of the concept that a conflict which 
is essentially local in nature does not require adjudication under fed-
eral admiralty law. 
Gail Rudie Cohn 
49. 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
50. The statute construed by the Remington court was section 2520 of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which provides: "Any person whose 
wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this 
chapter shall (I) have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, 
discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use such 
communications .... " 18 U.S.c. § 2520 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
51. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978). But if. Arch v. Arch, II Md. 
App. 395, 274 A.2d 646 (1971) (a wife cannot recover at law from her husband for 
a negligent tort, even if the parties are separated and have executed a separation 
agreement). 
52. See Macy v. Heverin, 44 Md. App. 358,408 A.2d 1067 (1979). The court in Macy 
refers to the "antediluvian dogma of sovereign immunity" as a "harsh doctrine" 
but notes that if the doctrine is to be changed, it must be by legislative action. Id. 
at 359 n.l, 408 A.2d at 1068 n.1. 
53. See id 
